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Hom: Criminal Procedure

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
ADAMSON v. RICKETTS: APPLYING
DOUBLE JEOPARDY TO PLEA BARGAIN
AGREEMENTS
I. INTRODUCTION
In Adamson v. Ricketts 11,1 the Ninth Circuit held that
double jeopardy principles prohibit a state from refiling original
criminal charges in circumstances where the trial court accepted
a plea agreement and had sentenced the defendant, even if subsequently the defendant intentionally breached the agreement. S
Because the court in Adamson II found that the defendant had
made no knowing waiver of his double jeopardy rights,II the defendant's sentence after his retrial on the more serious first-degree murder charge was a violation of the Fifth Amendment.4
Thus, the plea bargained second degree murder conviction and
resulting sentence was reinstated. II The court also held that a
.criminal defendant has a right to assert a reasonable interpretation of a plea bargain agreement that differs from the state's
interpretation.e

An en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed a district
court decision denying the defendant's writ of habeas corpus.'
1. 789 F.2d 722 (9th Cir. 1986) (en bane) (per Ferguson, J.; the other panel members
were Boochever, J., Hug, J., Nelson, J., Norris. J., Pregerson, J., Schroeder, J.; Kennedy,
J., dissenting; and Brunetti, J., dissenting, joined by Alarcon, J., Beezer, J., and Kennedy, J.), cert. granted, 55 U.S.L.W. 3188 (U.S. Sept. 30, 1986) (No. 86-6). An earlier
Ninth Circuit opinion affirming the denial of habeas corpus is referred to in this Note as
Adamson v. Ricketts I. See infra note 8.
2. Id. at 730.
3.ld.
4. See infra note 35.
5. Id. at 730-31.
6. Id. at 729.
7. Id. at 730.
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The district court decisions had been upheld by a preVIOUS
Ninth Circuit decision. 1I
II. FACTS
On June 2, 1976, a bomb exploded in a car occupied by Arizona investigative reporter Don Bolles, resulting in his death
eleven days later.lo At the time of his death, Bolles was investigating organized crime in Phoenix. Prior to his death, Bolles
made statements implicating Adamson in the bombing. l l Adamson was later arrested and charged with murder.u
In January 1977, Adamson and the state entered into a plea
agreement.13 In return for testifying against two other individuals, Adamson would plead guilty to second degree murder and
receive a sentence of 48-49 years in state prison, with actual incarceration time to be 20 years, 2 months.14 The Superior Court
accepted the agreement, and for the next three years Adamson
cooperated with authorities.l&
The other two people linked with the bombing were Max
Dunlap and James Robison. l• Adamson testified at their joint
trial for murder and conspiracy, stating that he was hired by
Dunlap and that Robison was the one who actually detonated
8. Adamson v. Ricketts I, 758 F.2d 441, 452-54 (9th Cir. 1985). The district court
findings are appendixed to the Ninth Circuit decision. Id.
9. Id. at 452. The court denied the defendant's petition for habeas corpus by holding that, although hearsay statements were improperly admitted at trial, the error was
harmless. Id. at 447-48; the Arizona death penalty statute (AlUz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13703 E. (1978» was not unconstitutional or arbitrarily applied in the case, Adamson v.
Ricketts I, 758 F.2d at 448-49; the record supported the imposition of the death penalty,
Id. at 450; and the defendant was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing, Id. at 449-50.
10. Arizona v. Dunlap, 125 Ariz. 104, 105, 608 P.2d 41, 42 (1980). Some of the facta
here are recounted from this case reversing the conviction of Max Dunlap. See infra text
accompanying note 20.
11. Arizona v. AdBnlSOn, 136 Ariz. 250, 253, 665 P.2d 972. 975 (1983), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 865 (1983). In affirming AdBnlSOn's retrial for first degree murder and the resulting death sentence, the court enumerated the factual history in some detail to support its finding that the murder was accomplished in an "especially cruel manner." Id. at
988.
12. Id. at 975.
13. Adamson v. R :ketts n, 789 F.2d at 724. The actual agreement is included 8!1
Appendix A of the decision. Id. See infra test accompanying note 74.
14.Id.
15.Id.
16. Arizona v. Dunlap. 125 Ariz. at 105, 608 P.2d at 42.
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the bomb after Adamson had placed it under Bolles' car.17 Both
Dunlap and Robison were convicted and sentenced to 29-30 year
prison terms on the conspiracy count and given the death penalty on the murder count. 18
While the Dunlap and Robison convictions were on appeal,
Adamson was sentenced, upon the state's motion, in December
1978 by the Superior Court to the agreed term of 48-49 years. 1'
In February 1980, the Arizona Supreme Court reversed the convictions of Dunlap20 and RobisonSl and remanded the cases for
new trials. 22
When the state approached Adamson regarding further testimony, Adamson informed the state that he had met his plea
bargained obligations by testifying at the first trial but would be
willing to testify at the Dunlap and Robison retrials in return for
additional consideration.ss hi April 1980, the state sent Adamson's attorney a letter stating that Adamson's refusal to testify
would be considered a breach of the plea agreement and may
result in prosecution for first degree murder and other charges
not previously discussed as part of the plea agreement.S4
At the pretrial hearing a few days later, Adamson repeated
his prior testimony but asserted a Fifth Amendment privilege
when questioned about another ~rime.211 Consequently, the state
17. Id.
18.ld.
19. AdllDlSOn v. Ricketts II. 789 F.2d at 724.
20. Arizona v. Dunlap. 125 Ariz. at 104. 608 P.2d at 41. The court reversed and
remanded the convictions oC Dunlap and Robison (lfee infra note 21) because the trial
court permitted the stata's key witness, Adamson, to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege several times during cross examination and yet reCused to strike AdaDlSOn's direct
testimony. Arizona v. Dunlap. 125 Ariz. at 106-07. 608 P.2d at 43-44. The court held that
this violated the deCendants' Sixth and Fourteenth rights by robbing them oC their right
to confrontation and cross examination. Id.
21. Arizona v. Robison. 125 Ariz. 107. 608 P.2d 44 (1980).
22. Arizona v. Dunlap. 125 Ariz. at 107. 608 P.2d at 44. Arizona v. Robison, 125 Ariz.
at 111. 608 P.2d at 48.
23. AdaDlSOn v. Ricketts II. 789 F.2d at 733-34. Adamson sought, inter alia. immediate release upon completion of the retrial testimony. relocation to a non-jail facility during the retrials. protection Cor himself and his family until his release, assistance in relocating and re-establishing a new identity outside of Arizona, and granting of immunity
Cor all other past crimes. Id.
24. Adamson v. Ricketts II. 789 F.2d at 734-35.
25. Id. at 724-25.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1987

3

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 1 [1987], Art. 9

80

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17:77

recharged Adamson with first degree murder. Adamson unsuccessfully challenged this new information by Special Action to
the Arizona Supreme Court.26 Adamson's offer at this point to
accept the state's interpretation of the plea agreement and to
cooperate fully was refused. 21 Adamson unsuccessfully sought
habeas corpus review through the federal district court.n After
the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial,u Adamson
was convicted of first, degree murder and sentenced to death.so
After exhausting all state remedies,sl Adamson's second petition
for habeas corpus review was denied. S2 This denial was upheld
by the Ninth CircuitSS but was vacated after an en bane hearing
by the Ninth Circuit giving rise to the present decision. S4
III. BACKGROUND
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution
states, inter alia, that no person shall "be subject for the same
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."s5 The policy
26. Id. at 725. The state's information charging Adamson with first degree murder
was upheld in Adamson v. Super. Ct. of Arizona, 125 Ariz. 579, 611 P.2d 932 (1980). The
Arizona State Supreme Court held that "[allthough the plea agreement does not specifically spell out the duration of petitioner's obligation, it. does contemplate full compliance
with the requests of the state until the objectives have been accomplished." Adamson v.
Super. Ct. of Arizona, 125 Ariz. at 583, 611 P.2d at 936. The court found that Adamson
breached the plea agreement and, additionally, had waived any double jeopardy defense.
Adamson v. Super. Ct. of Arizona, 125 Ariz. at 583-84, 611 P.2d at 936-37.
27. Adamson v. Ricketts II, 789 F.2d at 725.
28. Id. This unpublished decision upheld the district court's denial of Adamson's
petition.
29. Adamson v. Ricketts II, 789 F.2d at 725.
30.ld.
3!. Arizona v. Adamson, 136 Ariz. at 267, 665 P.2d at 989.
32. Adamson v. Ricketts I, 758 F.2d at 452-54.
33. Id. at 452. See supra text accompanying note 8.
34. Adamson II, 789 F.2d at 725. The issues raised by Adamson to the Ninth Circuit
were that (1) the Confrontation Clause was violated when the trial court permitted admission of certain evidence, Id., (2) his right to jury trial was infringed upon when the
court determined the eligibility of the death penalty,ld., (3) the Arizona death penalty
statute was unconstitutionally vague, Id., (4) there was prose..-utorial or judicial vindictiveness, Id., (5) the Eighth Amendment prohibition against "cruel and unUsual" punishment was violated by Arizona's statute requiring an automatic death sentence if aggravating circumstances are present, Id., and (6) the first degree murder prosecution after
Adamson's guilty plea and conviction for second degree murder violated the prohibition
against double jeopardy. ld.
35. U.S. CONST. amend. V. See generally Criminal Procedure: Double Jeopardy,
ANN. SURV. OF AM. LAw, Mar. 1986, at 309-24; Note, The Burden of Proof in Double
Jeopardy Claims, 82 MICH. L. REv. 365-86, (1983); Cantrell, Double Jeopardy and Multi-
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underlying the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits the government from subjecting a defendant to "[the] embarrassment, expense and ordeal [of multiple trials] and compelling him to live
in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity [reducing any
chance of rehabilitation], as well as enhancing the possibility
that even though innocent he may be found guilty."as The courts
have recognized that states generally have much greater resources and power to sustain multiple prosecutions than a defendant has to sustain a defense through such multiple
prosecutions. 37
The Double Jeopardy Clause incorporates three separate
guarantees: It prohibits the government from retrying the defendant after an acquittal, retrying the defendant after a conviction in the hope of obtaining a greater sentence, or punishing
the defendant more than once for the same offense.38 The prohibition against double jeopardy has been held to extend to all
crimes. 3e The Supreme Court, in Benton v. }..faryland,40 found it
to be "fundamental to the American scheme of justice"41 and
thus applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment.42
The fundamental test for whether a second prosecution is
barred by double jeopardy was first stated in Blockburger v.
U.S.43 Here the Court stated that "where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provipie Punishment: An historical and constitutional analysis. 24 S. TEx. L.J. 735-72
(1983).
36. Green v. United States. 355 U.S. 184. 187·88. The Court held here that Green
could not be tried for first degree murder after he had already been convicted of second
degree murder. Green had appealed his conviction. which was then reversed and reo

manded.Id.
37. Id. at 187.
38. IIIinoi3 v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410. 415 (1979). (citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395
U.S. 711. 717 (1969». The Court here discussed the application of the Blockburger test
(see infra note 43 and accompanying text) in examining whether a prosecution for invol·
untary manslaughter was precluded by a prior conviction for the offense of failing to
reduce speed to avoid an accident. Id.
39. Ex parte Lange. 85 U.S. 163 (1873).
40. 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
41. Benton. 395 U.s. at 794.
42. Id.
43. 284 U.S. 299 (1931). The Court affirmed the conviction of the defendant for sell·
ing morphine under two separate counts where each offense required the proof of a dif·
ferent element. Id. at 303·04.
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sions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two
offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of
an additional fact which the other does not."" In Blockburger,
the SU.preme Court upheld convictions for two separate offenses
arising from a single sale of illegal drugs where each count required proof of a different element.46
Implicit in the constitutional prohibition against prosecutjon for the same offense is the concept of finality protecting the
defendant from multiple prosecution~!e Otherwise, prosecutors
would be encouraged to reprosecute until the maximum penalty
is obtained."
Before a defendant can raise a double jeopardy defense,
jeopardy must have attached to the first prosecution. Jeopardy
is normally said to attach at trial once the jury is empanelled
and sworn.4S In a non-jury trial, jeopardy attaches when the
court begins to hear the evidence.'" In the majority of jurisdictions, double jeopardy is held not to apply when a defendant has
pleaded guilty to a lesser included offense pursuant to a plea
bargain. ISO However, there is authority to the contrary, prohibiting the governm~nt from reprosecuting for a greater offense. lSl In
U.S. v. Vaughn,1S2 the Ninth Circuit stated that when a defendant opts to forego a jury trial and instead pleads guilty to a
44. Id. at 304.
45. Id. at 302·05. The defendant was convicted for violating § 1 (selling of forbidden
drugs except in the originally stamped packages) and § 2 (selling drugs not in pursuance
of a written order) of the Harrison Narcotic Act. Id.
46. United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479 (1971).
47. United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 606 (1976).
48. Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28 (1978). Here, the Supreme Court held that "the fed·
eral rule that jeopardy attaches in a jury trial when the jury is empaneled and swr.rn •••
is an integral part of the Fifth Admendment guarantee against double jeopardy ..• Id.
at 28.
49. Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377 (1975). See generally J. Sigler, DOUBLE
JEOPARDY 39·47 (1969) for a general discussion of when jeopardy attaches.
so. Ward v. Page, 424 F.2d 491 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 917 (1970). A
lesser included offense is "one which is necessarily established by proof of the greater
offense." Fuller v. United States, 407 F.2d 1199, 1228 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 1120 (1969).
51. Mullreed v. Kropp, 425 F.2d 1095 (6th Cir. 1970). The defendant pleaded guilty
pursuant to a plea agreement to a lesser charge of unarmed robbery and was sentenced.
The conviction was later overturned on a collateral issue. The court here found an implied-acquittal of the greater charge of armed robbery, thus barring the state's attempt
to reprosecute. Id. at 1101-02.
52. 715 F.2d 1373 (9th Cir. 1983).
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charged offense, under some circumstances jeopardy attaches
when the judge accepts the plea. 53 In all cases, double jeopardy
attachrs when the judgment of conviction and sentence is
entered. 54
To interpret the actual meaning behind a plea bargain
agreement, the majority of courts apply contract law principles
which dictate that disputes over terms of an agreement are to be
resolved by objective standards. 55 Prior to Adamson II, the
Ninth Circuit followed the majority view. 58
IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
Although several constitutional issues were raised by the defendant,57 the majority found the double jeopardy question to be
dispositive of the case and declined to address the other issues. 58
The court first considered whether a prosecution for first degree
murder was barred by Adamson's guilty plea and conviction for
second degree murder, a lesser included offense. 50 It then analyzed whether Adamson waived any double jeopardy defenses. ao
The cou..-t found that jeopardy attached when the Arizona
trial court entered a judgment of conviction and sentenced
Adamson in 1978.al The court held that it was impermissible to
reprosecute the defendant under the greater charge of first degree murder.a2 The court applied the Blockburger testaa and concluded that "a conviction for second degree murder requires no
53. ld. at 1376.
54. United States v. Cruz, 709 F.2d 111 (1st Cir. 1983).
55. See United States e% rei. Williams v. McMann, 436 F.2d 103 (2nd Cir. 1970),
cert. der':ed, 402 U.s. 914 (1971). See generally E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 7.7-7.15
for a discussion of the principles of interpreting contracts.
56. United States v. Krasn, 614 F.2d 1229 (9th Cir. 1980). The court found that
although plea bargaining is a matter of criminal jurisprudence, a plea bargain itself is
contractual in nature and subject to contract law standards, and thus any dispute over
terms of agreement is to be resolved by objective standards.
57. Adamson v. Ricketts II, 789 F.2d at 725.
58. ld.
59. ld. at 725-27.
60. ld. at 727-30.
61. ld. at 726. The court did not decide whether jeopardy attached at the time
Adamson's guilty plea was accepted. In this case, Adamson's plea was accepted and he
was actually sentenced. ld.
62. ld. at 726-27.
63. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. at 304.
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fact that is not also needed to sustain a first degree murder conviction" in Arizona. M The court also emphasized that the state
recognized that first and second degree murder were not separate crimes by classifying them as different degrees of the same
offense. tlil Consequently, the court held that Adamson's double
jeopardy rights were violated by the subsequent prosecution for
first degree murder. 66
The court then addressed the issue of whether Adamson
waived his double jeopardy rights in the plea agreement. tl7 The
court analogized the double jeopardy protection to other similarly situated constitutional rights,ea concluding that any waivers
must be made voluntarily, knowingly, intelligent!y,ee and expressly.70 Here, the court found no knowing and intelligent
waiver: Adamson's actions in accepting the terms of the plea
agreement, which the state contended constituted a waiver, were
not taken with the knowledge that in so doing, he was waiving
his double jeopardy rights. 71
The court stated that Adamson reasonably believed that a
refusal to testify did not constitute a breach of the agreement.72
The court so held even though Adamson's counsel previously acknowledged that his client might be prosecuted on a first degree
murder charge should the Attorney General's office succeed in
withdrawing the plea agreement."
64. Adamson v. Ricketts II, 789 F.2d at 727.
65.ld.
SS.ld.
67. Id. at 727-30.
68. Id. at 727. See generally United States v. Cochran, 770 F.2d 850 (9th Cir. 1985)
(waiving the right to a jury trial); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (waiving the
right to assistance of counsel).
69. Adamson v. Ricketts II, 789 F.2d at 727 (citing Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61
(1975) and Launius v. United States, 575 F.2d 770 (9th Cir. 1978».
70. Adamson v. Ricketts II, 789 F.2d at 729.
71. Id. at 728-29.
72. Id. at 729.
73. Id. at 733. The letter dated April 3, 1980 from William Feldhacker, Adamson's
attorney, to the Assistant Attorney General states:
John Harvey Adamson is further fully aware of the fact
that your office may feel that he has not completed his obligatio:lll under the plea agreement in CR-93385 and, further, that
your office may attempt to withdraw that plea agreement from
him. He is aware that if the Statu were successful in doing so,
that he may be prosecuted for the killing of Donald Bolles on
a first degree murder charge. (Emphasis added.)
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The court found that the language of the plea bargain
agreement;" was "not clear''7G and was "reasonably"" subject to
Id.
74. Id. at 731-32. The relevant sections of Adamson's plea agreement to plead guilty
to second degree murder in return for testifying against Dunlap and Robison are:
The defendant, John Harvey Adamson, hereby agrees to
plead guilty to Murder, Second Degree.
4. The defendant hereby agrees to testify fully and completely in any CI':.lrt, State or Federal, when requested by
proper authorities against any and aU parties involved in the
murder of Don Bolles, and in the beating of Leslie Boros at
the Sheraton-Scottsdale, Maricopa County, Arizona, and any
and all parties involved in the crimes listed in Exhibits A and
B [omitted) ••••
5. It is agreed by aU parties that the defendant shall testify truthfully and completely at all times, whether undCl oath
or not, to the crimes mentioned in this agreement. This shall
include aU interviews, depositions, hearings and trials. Should
the defendant refuse to testify or should he at any time testify
untruthfully or if any material fact in the defendant's transcribed statements given to the State prior to this agreement
be false, then this ontire agreement is null and void and the
original charge will be automatically reinstated. The defendant will be subject to the charge of Open Murder, and if found
guilty of First Degree Murder, to the penalty of death or life
imprisonment requiring mandatory twenty-five years actual
incarceration, and the State shall be free to file any charges,
not yet filed as of the date of this agreement.

8. All parties to this agreement hereby waive the time for
sentencing and agree that the defendant will be sentenced at
the conclusion of his testimony in aU of the cases referred to
in this agreement • • • •

17. That the defendant understands the following rights
and understands that he gives up such rights by pleading
guilty:
a. His right to a jury trial;
b. His right to confront the witnesses against him and
crOBB-examine them;
Co His right to present evidence and call witnesses in his
defense, knowing that the State will compel such witnesses to
appear and testify;
d. His right to be represented by counsel (appointed free
of charge, if he cannot afi'ort [sic) to hire his own) at the tria1
of the proceedings; and
e. His right to remain silent, to refuse to be a witness
against himself, and to be presumed innocent until proven
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

Id.
75. Id. at 729.
76.Id.
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more than one interpretation. '1'1 Thus, the court held that a relinquishment of the double jeopardy defense could not have
been knowing or intentional. '111 The court found that, at trial, a
defendant has the right to assert a reasonable construction of an
agreement that differs from the state's interpretation.'111 To find
otherwise would force defendants into accepting the state's interpretation in all cases of alleged breach. llo
The court declined, as "ill-suited"111 and "inappropriate,"112
to apply pure contract principles to the terms of the plea agreement in interpreting whether Adamson impliedly waived his
constitutional right against double jeopardy." The court found
that such principles were more applicable for determining damages in civil contract litigation, rather than whether a defendant
waived a constitutional right.'· However, it did apply the general
maxim of contract construction of interpreting ambiguous language in an agreement less favorably against the party that supplied the language.8 &
In reaching its conclusion, the court noted four actions that
the government could have taken to ensure performance and to
bar a successful double jeopardy claim by Adamson: (1) drafted
the plea bargain agreement more competently," (2) specifically
stated that Adamson would waive the double jeopardy defense
and listed the circumstances under which the first degree
charges would be reinstated," (3) waited until the prosecutions
of Adamson's co-defendants were completed before having
Adamson sentenced,SII or (4) called Adamson to testify after he
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id.
Id. at 728-29.
Id. at 729.
Id. at 728-29.
81. Id. at 728.
82. Id. at 729.
83. Id. at 728-29.
84. Id. at 729.
85. See genera!ly FARNSWORTH, CoNTRACTS at § 7.11. "An especially common rule of
construction is that if language supplied by one party is reasonably susceptible to two
interpretations, one of which favors each party, the one that is less favorable to the party
who supplied the language is preferred." Id.
86. Adamson v. Ricketts II, 789 F.2d at 730.
87.ld.
88.ld.
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later agreed to do so.se
V. CRITIQUE
Should the United States Supreme Court uphold the decision in Adamson II, the benefits will extend only to a small class
of defendants in plea bargain situations. Although ruling in
favor of Adamson, the Ninth Circuit has clearly stated that had
the government employed better drafting of the plea bargain
agreement or timed the events of the case differently, the state
would have prevailed. eo
Jeopardy was found to attach when Adamson was sentenced. el In the future, prosecutors may simply wait for final
sentencing of co-defendants before asking for sentencing of the
testifying defendant. More likely, because of the amount of time
needed to reach a final judgment,~2 prosecutors in the future will
attempt to draft agreements containing an express waiver of a
double jeopardy claim in the event of a defendant's breach.
Adamson II will most benefit those defendants who have a
strong bargaining position and are able to exert a greater influence over the terms of a plea agreement. es However, in the majority of cases, the stronger bargaining position remains with the
-government. e4
The court refused to find an express waiver of Adamson's
double jeopardy rights. ell It also did not find an implied waiver
even though Adamson's attorney admitted that an unsuccessful
challenge to the terms of the plea agreement may result in pros89.ld.
9O.ld.
91. ld. at 726.
92. ld. at 724. Adamson's plea agreement was reached in January 1977. The conviction'.! of Dunlap and Robison were overturned in February 1980. ld.
93. J. BOND. PLEA BARGAINING AND GUILTY PLEAs § 2.12(a) (2d ed. 1983). (All studies
indicate the poor, the black, and the "least criminal" defendants get worse "deals" than
the affluent, the white, and the inveterate criminai defendants.)
94. See generally J. KLEtN. LJ;;T's MAKE A DEAL 17-20 (1976) for a general discussion
of the relative bargaining powers of prosecutors and defendants. See also Kipnis, Criminal Justice and the Negotiated Plea, 86 Ethics 93 (Jan. 1976) (Plea bargaining necessarily entails impermissible coercion.). But cf- Kent v. United States, 272 F.2d 795, 798-99
(lst Cir. 1959).
95. Adamson V. Ricketts II, 789 F.2d at 72:1.
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ecution on a first degree murder charge. 96 The court. by placing
less weight on statements made outside of the plea agreement.
was consistent in making the actual words in the agreement the
basis upon which to resolve any disputes in interpretation.
The Adamson II court noted that a defendant has the right
to assert a "reasonable'· (emphasis added) construction of a plea
agreement.I " Unfortunately. this right may be more illusory than
real. A defendant still faces the danger of a court finding that
his or her interpretation of an agreement is not reasonable. He
or she would then be in breach.98 Additionally. should the government. in future plea bargain agreements. retain the right to
reprosecute on greater charges. a defendant may have the
"right" to challenge the government's interpretation of the
agreement but he or she would obviously run great risks in doing
so.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In Adamson II. the Ninth Circuit held that double jeopardy
principles as applied to a plea bargain agreement prohibited the
state from refiling original first degree murder charges. The major result of the court's decision will be to force prosecutors to
draft more carefully written plea agreements so as to bar the
future use of double jeopardy as a possible defense by other
defendants.

Jimmy L. Hom*

96. See supra text accompanying note 73.
97. Adamson v. Ricketts II, 789 F.2d at 729.
98. For example, while the panel of the Ninth Circuit found that the agreement was
"not clear" and "reasonably subject to interpretation," ld. at 729, the Arizona Supreme
Court previously held that there was a "clear understanding" from the language of the
same agreement. Adamson v. Super. Ct. of Arizona, 125 Ariz. at 583, 611 P.2d at 936.
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1988.
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